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PRIVATE ACTORS, CORPORATE DATA AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: WHAT ASSISTANCE DO TECH COMPANIES
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Caren Morrison*
ABSTRACT
When the government investigates a crime, do citizens have a duty to assist?
This question was raised in the struggle between Apple and the FBI over whether
the agency could compel Apple to defeat its own password protections on the
iPhone of one of the San Bernardino shooters. That case was voluntarily dismissed
as moot when the government found a way of accessing the data on the phone, but
the issue remains unresolved.
Because of advances in technology, software providers and device makers have
been able to develop almost impenetrable protection for their customers’ informa-
tion, effectively locking law enforcement out of accounts and devices, even when
armed with a search warrant. Most privacy watchdogs, understandably shaken by
Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA spying, argue that this is an unadulterated
good. The prosecutorial view is that this is an unprecedented interference with law-
ful investigations.
There is no question that the companies fashioning themselves as champions of
privacy benefit financially from this position. Apple has openly admitted in court
filings that complying with court orders to assist in the execution of search warrants
could “substantially tarnish Apple’s brand.” But while Apple may bear some respon-
sibility for creating a system that it could not access itself, does that mean they
should be statutorily tasked with undoing it?
Current statutory law, in particular the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), does not cover the encrypted information on physical
devices, or information companies’ responsibilities to decrypt it. This Essay takes
the question of whether CALEA should be amended as a starting point for a broader
exploration of what assistance the government can justly ask of its citizens.
There are strong arguments to be made that such obligations would not be
reasonable, or that there should be a zone of privacy that the government cannot
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access. This would support a system in which some warrants are ineffectual. But if
the functional impossibility of execution of these warrants is just the byproduct of a
corporate strategy, “them’s the breaks” seems like an insufficient justification.
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INTRODUCTION
When the government investigates a crime, do citizens have a duty to assist?
This question was raised in the struggle between Apple and the FBI over whether the
agency could compel Apple to defeat its own password protections on the iPhone
of one of the San Bernardino shooters.1 That case was voluntarily dismissed as moot
when the government found a way of accessing the data on the phone.2 However,
1 See Devlin Barrett, Apple Fight Gets Technical: Justice Department, Apple Trade Salvos
Over Basic Issues in Locked-iPhone Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2016, at B1. Apple’s recal-
citrance was new; in the past, Apple had been able to easily assist law enforcement agencies
in accessing password-protected iPhones. Joel Rose, The Seeds of Apple’s Standoff with DOJ
May Have Been Sown in Brooklyn, NPR (Feb. 22, 2016, 5:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016
/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-standoff-with-doj-may-have-been-sown-in-brooklyn
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171113021316/https://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161
/the-seeds-of-apples-standoff-with-doj-may-have-been-sown-in-brooklyn]. This easy access,
however, meant that malefactors might also bypass privacy protections. See Corinne Ramey,
DA Can’t Unlock 423 Apple Devices, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2016, at A11A. Apple, there-
fore, developed a more advanced operating system that contained protocols that protected
iPhone users from unwanted intrusions. Devlin Barrett et al., Apple, Others Encrypt Phones,
Fueling Government Standoff, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2014, at A1. By design, Apple ensured
that it could not easily bypass the protections either. See Steven R. Morrison, Breaking iPhones
Under CALEA and the All Writs Act: Why the Government Was (Mostly) Right, 38 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2039, 2041 (2017).
2 Morrison, supra note 1, at 2043–44.
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the issue remains unresolved, even as the government has asked Apple to unlock
other iPhones,3 and Apple continues to refine its encryption technology.4
Because of advances in technology, software providers and device makers have
been able to develop almost impenetrable protection for their customers’ informa-
tion, effectively locking law enforcement out of accounts and devices, even when
armed with a search warrant.5 Most privacy watchdogs, understandably shaken by
Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA spying, argue that this is an unadulterated
good.6 The prosecutorial view is that this is an unprecedented interference with
lawful investigations.7
In the early 1990s, when telephonic communications were moving from copper
wire based technology to fiber optics, the government faced a similar challenge. Be-
cause of the change in interception technology, it could no longer conduct wiretaps
and obtain pen registers without assistance from the telephone company.8 The issue
was resolved by the passage of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act (CALEA), enacted in 1994.9 CALEA placed an affirmative duty on “tele-
communications carriers” to ensure that, regardless of how their technology evolved,
they retained the ability to assist the government with lawful interceptions.10
The challenge of encryption and unbreakable smartphones has updated this issue
for today. Until recently, encryption might have only been used by the kinds of highly
motivated, sophisticated actors who were capable of developing or seeking it out
3 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Joseph Goldstein, Apple Faces U.S. Demand to Unlock 9
More iPhones, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/technol
ogy/justice-department-wants-apple-to-unlock-nine-more-iphones.html.
4 See Jose Pagliery, Apple Gets New Encryption Patent—Even as It Fights the FBI, CNN
(Mar. 18, 2016, 3:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/17/technology/apple-encryption
-patent/index.html [https://perma.cc/NT3V-E4UY].
5 See Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, EncryptionCongressMOD (Apple + CALEA), 30 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 355, 399–402 (2017). This includes unbreakable encryption, phones that lock and
delete data after a set number of unsuccessful log-on attempts, and communications plat-
forms that retain no information at all. See id. at 403 & n.213; see also Cara McGoogan, Re-
vealed: The Most Secure Messaging Apps, TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Oct. 25, 2016, 12:22 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/10/25/revealed-the-most-secure-messaging
-apps/ [https://perma.cc/WZL2-DFXF] (describing communications platforms with end to
end encryption and auto-deleting messages).
6 See Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 357–58, 424.
7 Valerie Caproni, the former general counsel for the FBI, described Internet providers
as “promising their customers that they will thumb their nose at a U.S. court order.” Charlie
Savage, U.S. Is Working to Ease Wiretaps on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A1.
In the agency’s view, companies can promise strong encryption so long as they can “figure
out how they can provide us plain text.” Id.
8 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 372.
9 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012); see also Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 356–57.
10 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 357.
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themselves; they are unlikely to be affected by even a total ban on encryption.11 But
now, even low-tech people (like your narrator) are using encryption simply by virtue
of having a relatively new iPhone, as “firms have begun incorporating very powerful
encryption features into mass-market consumer-grade products and services.”12
Now, practically unbreakable encryption is the norm, as Apple and Google have
made it standard on all devices since 2014.13 Apple has staked its reputation on this
publicly, announcing that for all iPhones running iOS 8 and higher, the company
“will not perform iOS data extractions [in response to government search warrants]
as data extraction tools are no longer effective.”14 Apple never explained the irony of
it being unable to extract data through its own actions. But while Apple may bear
some responsibility for creating a system that it could not access itself, does that
mean that the corporation should be statutorily tasked with undoing it?
This Essay takes the question of whether CALEA should be amended (or a new
statute passed) as a starting point for a broader exploration of what assistance the gov-
ernment can justly ask of its citizens. There is a relative dearth of literature on the
topic,15 and I do not propose to resolve these issues within this Essay. I only hope to
raise some questions that should be addressed in any project of legislative reform,
particularly when that project contemplates imposing affirmative obligations of assis-
tance on private parties who have no direct connection to government investigations.
11 See id. at 402 (“Even if encryption software was outlawed, the underlying algorithms
are already understood and widely available.”). Hurwitz makes a helpful distinction between
three categories of encryption users: first, people deemed to be threats to national security,
who may be highly motivated to use encryption to further terrorist schemes; second, dissident
minorities at risk of persecution by their government, who are highly motivated to escape
government surveillance; and finally, ordinary criminals. Id. at 401–02.
12 Id. at 415.
13 See Devlin Barrett & Danny Yadron, Phone Protections Alarm Law Enforcement:
Moves by Apple and Google to Put Some Data Out of Reach of Police Are Latest Fallout from
Snowden’s Disclosures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2014, at A4.
14 Legal Process Guidelines: U.S. Law Enforcement, APPLE, at III. I. (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RW8N-Z3W3]. The company added, “The files to be extracted are protected by an en-
cryption key that is tied to the user’s passcode, which Apple does not possess.” Id. Its current
Legal Process Guidelines state, somewhat more apologetically, “Apple is unable to perform
an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted,
and Apple does not possess the encryption key.” Legal Process Guidelines: Government
& Law Enforcement Within the United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal
/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RK-VAEY] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017).
15 One of the few discussions of this issue in the literature is Jon C. Blue, High Noon
Revisited: Commands of Assistance by Peace Officers in the Age of the Fourth Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 1475 (1992) (arguing that laws requiring citizens to assist the police at pos-
sible physical risk to themselves are unconstitutional).
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The current situation places the power to limit the scope of the government’s inves-
tigative abilities, not with any branch of government, but with private corporations.
In the name of the privacy and security of their customers, Apple and its counter-
parts have been able to render certain information effectively inaccessible, whether
through encryption, password protection, or automatic file deletion.16 Their new po-
sition as champions of privacy and bulwarks against government snooping may be
based on deeply held beliefs. It may be based on market calculations. Apple has
openly admitted in court filings that complying with court orders to assist in the ex-
ecution of search warrants could “substantially tarnish the Apple brand.”17 But while
it seems unlikely that the aim was to interfere deliberately with government investi-
gations, that has been the result. How the dilemma should be resolved will depend
upon one’s view of the role of technology, the value of corporate autonomy, the ne-
cessity of criminal investigations and the power of search warrants.
Part I gives a brief sketch of the various statutes that touch on, but fail to govern
these issues, and reviews the issues raised in the FBI-Apple litigation. Part II ex-
amines the three primary objections to updating CALEA to cover these questions,
namely lack of necessity, futility, and threats to security. All of this leads us back, in
Part III, to the question posed at the beginning: What help do private actors, not
implicated directly in criminal or terrorist investigations, owe to the government?
I. AN UNSATISFYING STATUTORY LANDSCAPE
These issues all came to a head after the FBI obtained a warrant to search the smart-
phone of one of the people responsible for the December 2015 terrorist mass shoot-
ing in San Bernardino,18 then found it was unable to unlock it.19 The phone was an
iPhone 5c, which was full-disk-encrypted, meaning that its data could only be accessed
16 Obviously, some are alarmed by this development. See Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. et al., Opin-
ion, When Phone Encryption Blocks Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/08/12/opinion/apple-google-when-phone-encryption-blocks-justice.html
?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=E26C36E29DA63582FC9B1C47EB3B2415&gwt=pay
&assetType=opinion (“[I]n the absence of laws that keep pace with technology, we have en-
abled two Silicon Valley technology companies to upset that balance fundamentally.”).
17 Apple Inc.’s Response to Court’s October 9, 2015 Memorandum and Order at 4, In re
Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this
Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-mc-01902-JO). Possibly realizing how
mercenary this sounded, Apple followed up with a post on its website in which it claimed
that its refusal to comply with government orders was “absolutely not” related to marketing
or business strategy concerns. Answers to Your Questions About Apple and Security, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers [https://perma.cc/3E4P-7MM4] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017). “Nothing could be further from the truth,” it added. Id.
18 I decline to grant this individual the courtesy of naming him.
19 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 403.
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with its user’s individual passcode,20 and which moreover could not be opened by
a brute force attack or all the data would be wiped.21 The government asked Apple for
help, and the company refused, triggering a heated—and highly public—bout of
litigation.22 The district court granted the FBI a writ under the All Writs Act23 (AWA)
compelling Apple to assist in the execution of the search warrant.24 But after Apple ap-
pealed, the government abruptly withdrew its petition when it reportedly paid an
unnamed hacker to break into the phone.25
This dispute (which resulted in two magistrate judges reaching conflicting
conclusions) revealed a statutory scheme ill-equipped to deal with the pace of tech-
nological change.26 Certainly, none of the existing statutes said anything about ac-
cessing information on a physical device encrypted by a provider of information
20 See Kristen M. Jacobsen, Note, Game of Phones, Data Isn’t Coming: Modern Mobile
Operating System Encryption and Its Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 566, 573 (2017). For an exquisitely technical explanation of full-disk encryption, see
generally KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDE TO STOR-
AGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR END USER DEVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY § 3.1.1 (2007), http://nvlpubs.nist
.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-111.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT8E-E7G9].
21 See Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 584–85 (describing brute force extraction and its lim-
itations). The operating system automatically deletes all information after ten wrong pass-
word attempts. Id. at 585.
22 See id. at 569. Apple CEO Tim Cook lost little time in writing an open letter to his cus-
tomers, saying, “We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the
U.S. government. . . . [U]ltimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very free-
doms and liberty our government is meant to protect.” Tim Cook, A Message to Our Cus-
tomers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/38X4
-WNDG]. This earned him plaudits for being a champion of privacy. See Katie Benner &
Nicole Perlroth, How Tim Cook, In iPhone Battle, Became a Bulwark for Digital Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/technology/how-tim-cook
-became-a-bulwark-for-digital-privacy.html?mcubz=3. For a good recounting of the facts of
the litigation, see Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 568–69.
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
24 See Eric Lichtblau, Judge Tells Apple to Help Unlock iPhone Used by San Bernardino
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/judge-tells
-apple-to-help-unlock-san-bernardino-gunmans-iphone.html.
25 See Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone
-fbi-justice-department-case.html. Reuters reported that the assistance came from an Israeli
forensics company, Cellebrite. See Israeli Firm Helping FBI to Open Encrypted iPhone: Re-
port, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryp
tion-cellebrite-idUSKCN0WP17J [https://perma.cc/RC46-KKXE].
26 As one student puts it, courts face difficulty “applying the limited and antiquated stat-
utes and case law surrounding this issue.” John Mylan Traylor, Note, Shedding Light on the
“Going Dark” Problem and the Encryption Debate, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 489, 503 (2017).
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services. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) cov-
ered telecommunications carriers, but not providers of information services.27 The
Stored Communications Act (SCA) did cover information service providers, but
only applied to the content of communications, such as emails, held by third parties,
not stored on an individual’s smartphone.28 CALEA imposed affirmative duties on
telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in conducting wiretaps and
pen registers, but specifically exempted encryption from its reach.29
Apple, in short, was not the type of entity meant to be covered by CALEA,30 and
the government’s requested order had nothing to do with wiretapping. Indeed, the
whole reason that the FBI was forced to dust off the All Writs Act, enacted in 1789,
was that none of the existing statutes seemed to cover their specific situation.31 But
because CALEA is one of the few statutes to impose an affirmative duty to assist in
government investigations, and the AWA can be used to compel third parties to act,
the following section will examine them both.
A. CALEA: An Explicit Imposition of Duty
As mentioned above, CALEA was enacted at a time of technological change in
telecommunications, which affected the government’s ability to conduct wiretaps.32
In the old days, wiretapping was almost laughably low-tech, since “[f]irst[-]genera-
tion wiretaps were conducted through copper telephone wires by simply touching a
separate copper wire against the phone line running from [a suspect’s] house to the lo-
cal phone company.”33 As these copper wires were replaced by fiber optic cables,
the old wiretap technology became less useful.34 The government raised the alarm
27 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2) (2012) (clarifying that 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) does not apply
to information services or equipment facilities).
28 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
29 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3).
30 In fact, Apple specifically referred to itself as an entity that provides information ser-
vices, rather than as a telecommunications provider. See Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion
to Compel Assistance at 8 n.13, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Ex-
ecution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203,
No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate
Order]. This seems like a fair characterization.
31 See Traylor, supra note 26, at 505.
32 Hugh J. McCarthy, Decoding the Encryption Debate: Why Legislating to Restrict
Strong Encryption Will Not Resolve the “Going Dark” Problem, J. INTERNET L., Sept. 2016,
at 1, 20 (discussing CALEA as a response to the development of fiber optic cables).
33 Id.
34 See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, ‘Going Dark’ Versus a ‘Golden Age for Surveil-
lance,’ CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 28, 2011), https://cdt.org/blog/%E2%80%98
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that it was “going dark,” losing the ability to wiretap suspects.35 In response, Congress
passed CALEA,36 which ensured that telecommunications companies would con-
tinue to provide investigative agencies with the technological resources they needed
to maintain their investigations.37
CALEA, which can most charitably be described as “exceptionally technical,”38
is a fairly limited statute: its only brief was to preserve the government’s ability to con-
duct wiretaps and obtain pen registers,39 leaving developing technologies for another
day. It therefore imposed an obligation on any telecommunications carrier to “ensure
that its equipment, facilities, or services” remained capable of “enabling the govern-
ment, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept . . . all wire
and electronic communications” transmitted by that carrier.40 The statute also im-
posed an obligation that telecommunications carriers maintain the ability to enable
the government to obtain pen registers.41
Beyond that, the statute explicitly barred the government from requiring or ban-
ning any particular design feature in the carrier’s equipment or services.42 This way,
the companies could run their service however they wanted, so long as the govern-
ment’s ability to wiretap43 was not adversely affected. This was in marked contrast
going-dark%E2%80%99-versus-a-%E2%80%98golden-age-for-surveillance%E2%80%99/
[https://perma.cc/2P2Z-KX2V].
35 See id.
36 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827(I) [hereinafter CALEA HOUSE REPORT], pt. 1, at 9 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489 (explaining that CALEA’s purpose was “to pre-
serve the government’s ability . . . to intercept communications involving advanced tech-
nologies such as digital or wireless transmission modes, or features and services such as call
forwarding, speed dialing and conference calling, while protecting the privacy of communi-
cations and without impeding the introduction of new technologies, features, and services”).
37 Id. at 3489–90. Wiretaps record conversations that take place over a tapped phone,
while pen registers record the numbers called by a given telephone, but do not divulge any
content. Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 362.
38 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 373.
39 CALEA was “intended to preserve the status quo . . . to provide law enforcement no
more and no less access to information than it had in the past.” CALEA HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 36, at 3502.
40 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (2012).
41 Id. § 1002(a)(2). This section also exempts “any information that may disclose the
physical location of the subscriber.” Id. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
42 Id. § 1002(b)(1)(A)–(B) (providing that no law enforcement agencies or officers may
“require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configu-
rations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service” nor
“prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider of a wire
or electronic communication service”).
43 For the purposes of the CALEA discussion, I am including the obtaining of pen
registers under this term for convenience sake. See CALEA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 36,
at 3490.
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to early drafts of the Act, “which would have barred introduction of services or fea-
tures that could not be tapped.”44
CALEA also expressly exempted “information services” from its reach,45 which
meant that, at least initially, the Act did not apply to Internet Service Providers.46 As
noted above, the SCA does cover information service providers,47 but only applies
to the content of communications, and then only when the communications are held
by third parties on remote servers.48 It sheds no light on the problem of accessing an
encrypted device, or communications saved by parties to the communications.49
Finally, and of particular interest to Apple, CALEA explicitly protected tele-
communications companies from being forced to decrypt “or ensuring the govern-
ment’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer.”50
There was only one situation in which a carrier could be compelled to assist in decrypt-
ing a communication, and that was when “the encryption was provided by the carrier
44 Id. at 3499.
45 § 1002(b)(2)(A). CALEA defined “information services,” fairly unhelpfully, as “the
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, re-
trieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications; and includes a
service that permits a customer to retrieve stored information from, or file information for
storage in, information storage facilities; electronic publishing; and electronic messaging
services.” 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6)(A)–(B) (2012) (internal subsection markers omitted). The
definition of “telecommunications providers” was later extended by the FCC to include
broadband providers and VoIP (voice over Internet protocol) platforms such as Skype. See
Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This interpretation was
ruled a “reasonable policy choice” by the District of Columbia and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeals. See Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 220 (3d Cir. 2007); Am.
Counsel on Educ., 451 F.3d at 232.
46 See § 1002(b)(2); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Allowable Use of Federal Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15 A.L.R. Fed.
2d 537, § 2 (2006) (“It is noteworthy that CALEA does not cover ‘information services’ such
as e-mail and Internet access.”).
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2012); In re Order Authorizing Prospective & Con-
tinuous Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 892 n.11 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (“The SCA ‘only regulates information pertaining to customers or subscribers of cov-
ered information services.’” (quoting Nathaniel Gleicher, Neither a Customer Nor a Sub-
scriber Be: Regulating the Release of User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE
L.J. 1945, 1947 (2009))). See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Commu-
nications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
48 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036,
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY
ACT (ECPA) 1 (2015) (giving examples, such as Google turning over emails or Facebook
providing private posts).
49 Id. at summary (noting that the SCA “does not apply to government access to records
held by a party to the communication”).
50 § 1002(b)(3).
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and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”51
The exemption for encryption, it turns out, was based on a government miscalculation.
The initial draft of CALEA “imposed substantial limits on the use of encryption
by telecommunications carriers.”52 But this proposal faced considerable opposition,53
while in the meantime, the government had developed what it believed to be a
viable backdoor into encrypted communications in the form of an “escrowed en-
cryption standard” that was to be housed in a low-cost microchip.54 This microchip,
known as the “Clipper Chip,” would have been included in all commercial electron-
ics.55 In order to avoid a costly legislative fight, and because they thought a practical
solution had been found, the FBI and Congress agreed to put off legislation on en-
cryption until a later date.56 Encryption by telecommunications carriers was there-
fore kept out of the requirements of CALEA.
Unfortunately for the government, the Clipper Chip “was shown to have signif-
icant design flaws that rendered it insecure”—a costly and embarrassing setback.57
Meanwhile, CALEA did nothing to help law enforcement deal with the increasing use
and growing strength of encryption. Therefore, cautions Gus Hurwitz, it is incorrect to
read the statute as specifically endorsing encryption.58 In fact, he argues that “the
51 Id. The CALEA House Report similarly noted that “telecommunications carriers have
no responsibility to decrypt encrypted communications . . . unless the carrier provided the
encryption and can decrypt it.” CALEA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 36, at 3504 (emphasis
added). In other words, this requirement did not “prohibit a carrier from deploying an
encryption service for which it does not retain the ability to decrypt communications for law
enforcement access.” Id. Steven Morrison points out that there is considerable ambiguity in
the phrase, “possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication,” because it
could suggest either present possession of existing code that could decrypt the com-
munication, or “possession of the knowledge and technological ability to develop the code.”
Morrison, supra note 1, at 2067 (emphasis omitted in first quote). Conceivably, Apple
“possesses the information” necessary to decrypt if the term “possess” is understood as
“having the technological savoir faire and know-how” to develop the necessary code to de-
crypt, as opposed to already having the code on hand. See id. Under that reading, most tele-
communications companies, including Apple, if it was so designated, would be on the hook
even under CALEA.
52 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 369.
53 See, e.g., HAL ABELSON ET AL., THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW, AND
TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY ENCRYPTION 19 (1997) (arguing that mandatory key recovery sys-
tems are “less secure, more costly, and more difficult to use”).
54 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 406.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 407–08 (“The FBI believed that it had a workable escrow standard that
mooted the need to address encryption at the time CALEA was adopted.”).
57 Id. at 407.
58 Id. at 408. Because the omission was deliberate, writes Hurwitz, “it is factually wrong
to say that CALEA addressed encryption in any direct or meaningful way—let alone that it
is a blanket expression of congressional approval for the use of encryption.” Id.
2017] PRIVATE ACTORS, CORPORATE DATA AND NATIONAL SECURITY 417
only thing that CALEA can tell us about Congress’s views toward encryption is that
Congress has concerns about encryption but doesn’t know what to do about them.”59
So CALEA’s lessons on encryption are debatable at best, and did not really
address the sort of issues raised by the Apple dispute—accessing the data on a phys-
ical device in the custody of the government. What is significant about the statute
is that it imposes an affirmative obligation on private actors to shape their com-
mercial and technological behavior in a way that can assist the government, while
at the same time forbidding the government to dictate any particular design—two
aims that seem in tension. While there are plenty of statutes that require compliance
with law enforcement on the behalf of private parties—complying with subpoenas
and warrants, rendering the technical assistance to initiate and maintain a wiretap—
CALEA represents a difference in kind. Unlike the Wiretap Act60 (or the duty to
hand over your clients’ bank records), CALEA “imposes an affirmative ex ante ob-
ligation on third parties to design their systems so as to be capable of providing such
assistance in the future.”61
B. Apple and the FBI Meet the All Writs Act
The story of Apple’s relationship with the FBI has the tang of a romance gone
sour. According to a report issued by the Manhattan District Attorney, up until re-
cently, Apple cooperated quite well with the government.62 The report reminisces
how Apple was able to tout its user security and still “maintain[ ] the ability to help
‘police investigating robberies and other crimes, searching for missing children, try-
ing to locate a patient with Alzheimer’s disease, or hoping to prevent a suicide.’”63
During that period, prosecutors’ offices were able to get search warrants coupled with
“unlock orders” that required the companies to assist in data extraction procedures.64
“Then, without explanation,” the report says, “Apple changed its position and refused
59 Id.
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (stating that third parties served with an order under
the Wiretap Act “shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical
assistance necessary to accomplish the interception”).
61 Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 409. Hurwitz goes on to argue that this is not as unusual as
it seems, as legislatures “frequently impose design obligations [in building or banking] in or-
der to stave off foreseeable future problems.” Id. But it seems to me that there is a difference
between mandating that entry points on a building comply with the ADA and telling com-
panies that they cannot build their most profitable and popular structures in the first place.
62 See MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC
SAFETY 19 (2016) [hereinafter DA REPORT].
63 Id. at 13 (citing Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy, APPLE (June 16, 2013),
https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/9YKK
-MW7W]).
64 See Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 587 (citing DA REPORT, supra note 62, at 4).
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to comply with court-issued extraction orders, regardless of the operating system
running on the device.”65
After the San Bernardino terrorist attack, the government asked Apple for help
in breaking into the perpetrator’s iPhone, but Apple refused, claiming that it could
not comply with the order without creating code that would jeopardize the privacy
protections of its millions of customers.66 Because, in the government’s view, CALEA
did not apply to a situation involving the decryption of a physical device, the gov-
ernment turned to the AWA, part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that
district courts can “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”67 In this case, the
government had a valid search warrant based on probable cause, issued by a court,
but it was unable to execute it. The government therefore argued that the court could
thus issue a writ compelling Apple to help the FBI to execute the warrant.68 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California issued the writ, and
Apple appealed.69 After some heated motion practice, the FBI abruptly withdrew its
request, having found an alternative way to crack the phone.70
But the case raised some unresolved questions about the reach of the statutory
scheme: whether it covered tech giants like Apple and Google, and whether it left
room for the AWA to play a role. This is because the AWA is most properly seen
as a gap-filling measure, a way “to fill[ ] the interstices of federal judicial power
when those gaps threaten[ ] to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’
jurisdiction.”71 Apple argued that the AWA could not apply where Congress had
already spoken.72 The duties imposed on companies by CALEA were similar to the
task requested by the government, but information services companies such as Apple
were explicitly exempted from their reach.73 And because the statute forbid the
65 See DA REPORT, supra note 62, at 19.
66 See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 30, at 7.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). This request was factually unprecedented; as the Supreme
Court had earlier noted, “it [wa]s difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case
today where [an AWA writ] would be necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States,
517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)).
68 See Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Christopher
Pluhar; Exhibit at 3, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2016).
69 See generally Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 30.
70 See Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 404.
71 Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985).
72 See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 30, at 15–19.
73 As Steven Morrison points out, “[E]ven if CALEA did govern information service pro-
viders, Congress specifically exempted only telecommunications carriers from the duty to
decrypt—it could have, but did not, exempt information service providers.” Morrison, supra
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government from imposing design features or limiting encryption, similar requests
could not be granted under the AWA.74 Conveniently, Apple was not a telecommu-
nications provider, so the affirmative part of the statute did not apply.
The magistrates who were asked to apply the AWA did not have a large body
of doctrine to draw on. The Supreme Court had addressed the application of the
AWA, and concomitantly the legality of imposing affirmative duties on third parties,
in United States v. New York Telephone Co.75 That case arose in the late 1970s, when
the FBI was investigating an illegal gambling ring on East 14th Street in Manhattan
and obtained a court order authorizing the installation of two pen registers.76 At that
time, pen registers were mechanical devices that had to be literally attached to the
target’s telephone line.77 Because the devices would have been visible to an alert ob-
server78 and the agency did not want to tip off the targets of the investigation, it
asked New York Telephone to lease two additional telephone lines so the pen reg-
isters could be installed some distance away from the target location.79 For reasons
that remain obscure, the phone company “refused to lease lines to the FBI which
were needed to install the pen registers in an unobtrusive fashion.”80 Instead, the
company “advised the FBI to string cables from the ‘subject apartment’ to another
location where pen registers could be installed.”81
note 1, at 2071. If so, he argues, “CALEA’s protection of telecommunications carriers from
any duty to decrypt does not extend to information service providers.” Id. at 2072. So, if only
telephone companies are exempt from the duty to decrypt (except under certain specific, not-
fully understood conditions), then presumably such a duty could be imposed on information
service providers. See id. at 2071–72.
74 See id. at 2063–64.
75 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
76 See id. at 161–62.
77 See id. at 161 n.1.
78 Pen Register, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pen_register [https://perma
.cc/V92Q-Z6FX] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (citing U.S. Patent No. 1647 (issued June 20,
1840)) (“The term pen register originally referred to a device for recording telegraph signals
on a strip of paper. Samuel F.B. Morse’s 1840 telegraph patent described such a register as
consisting of a lever holding an armature on one end, opposite an electromagnet, with a
fountain pen, pencil or other marking instrument on the other end, and a clockwork mech-
anism to advance a paper recording tape under the marker.”).
79 See Jack Pringle, From Breaking Down Doors to Building Back Doors: The FBI-Apple
Case Is Only the Latest Battle Pitting Privacy Against the Need to Investigate Crime, S.C.
LAW., Jan. 2017, at 34, 38–39.
80 N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 162.
81 Id. at 163. This was not terribly helpful, since “because of the location of the apartment
and because the suspects were known to use counter-surveillance techniques, the FBI deter-
mined that ‘if men were observed stringing lines and cables from the subject apartment to
another location, the gambling operation would cease to function.’” Brief for the United
States at 9, N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. 159 (No. 76-835) (internal citations omitted). So some poor
FBI agent had to canvass the neighborhood for four days, looking for a “location where [the
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The FBI successfully sought a writ obliging assistance under the AWA.82 New
York Telephone defended its position on the basis that, because the pen register
application was not attached to a Title III wiretap order, it was under no obligation
to provide assistance.83 In determining whether it was proper to issue a writ under
the AWA,84 the Supreme Court effectively considered three factors that were later
distilled as:
1. the closeness of the relationship between the person or en-
tity to whom the proposed writ is directed and the matter
over which the court has jurisdiction;
2. the reasonableness of the burden to be imposed on the writ’s
subject; and
3. the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court’s jurisdic-
tion . . . .85
It reasoned that New York Telephone was not too far removed from the controversy,
that the burden on it was not unreasonable, and that the FBI would have been ef-
fectively barred from installing a useful pen register without the company’s assis-
tance.86 Therefore, the AWA did allow the order.87
What is notable is that the Court reversed a ruling of the appellate court that it
interpreted as “generally barring district courts from ordering any party to assist in
the installation or operation of a pen register.”88 Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority, seemed unmoved by arguments that an order demanding assistance in in-
stalling a pen register “pose[d] a severe threat to the autonomy of third parties who
for whatever reason prefer not to render such assistance.”89 On the contrary, not
forcing them to comply, he wrote, “would frustrate the clear indication by Congress
agency] could string its own wires and attach the pen registers without alerting the suspects.”
Id. He didn’t find one. N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 163.
82 See N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 163.
83 Id.
84 While the district court issued a writ under the AWA ordering the phone company to
comply with the pen register order, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
“express[ing] concern that ‘such an order could establish a most undesirable, if not dan-
gerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid on
private third parties.’” Id. at 164 (quoting Application of United States in re Pen Register
Order, 538 F.2d 956, 962–63 (2d Cir. 1976)).
85 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued
by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
86 See N.Y. Tel., 434 U.S. at 174–75.
87 Id. at 176–78.
88 See id. at 171.
89 Id.
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that the pen register is a permissible law enforcement tool by enabling a public util-
ity to thwart a judicial determination that its use is required.”90
The power conferred by the AWA, concluded the Court, allowed a court to dic-
tate “to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrong-
doing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper
administration of justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any af-
firmative action to hinder justice.”91
While the magistrate judge presiding over the Apple case in California fol-
lowed New York Telephone in issuing a writ under the AWA, in a similar case in the
Eastern District of New York, a magistrate judge declined to do so. That court con-
sidered a request pursuant to the AWA for assistance in breaking into a suspect’s
password-protected iPhone, but ruled that it could not use the AWA because CALEA
was part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that left no gaps.92
The AWA, reasoned the court, could neither be “interpreted to empower courts
to do something that another statute already authorizes (but that might have thresh-
old requirements that cannot be satisfied in the circumstances of a particular case),”93
nor be used “to issue an order that is explicitly or implicitly prohibited under a fed-
eral statute.”94 Taking CALEA and the SCA together, the New York court found
“a comprehensive legislative scheme” that prevented use of the AWA.95 Specifi-
cally, the court found that “[t]he absence from that comprehensive scheme of any
requirement that Apple provide the assistance sought here implies a legislative de-
cision to prohibit the imposition of such a duty.”96 This is not entirely persuasive. This
argument assumes that Congress in 1994, over two decades before the launch of the
iPhone, had envisaged the difficulties of breaching the encryption on such a device,
and decided to prohibit it.
90 Id. at 178.
91 Id. at 174 (internal citations omitted).
92 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant
Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). The court noted that
although CALEA did not regulate data at rest, the Stored Communications Act (SCA) did.
See id. at 355–56 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (2012)). But none of the SCA’s provisions
“imposed any obligation on Apple to provide the assistance at issue,” and “CALEA ex-
pressly stated that the assistance requirement did not apply to ‘information services.’” Id. at
356 (footnote omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A)).
93 Id. at 353.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 357. The flaw in this argument is that it converts a political compromise to defer
issues of encryption into an active commitment to protect encryption, in other words, “a
legislative choice to exempt tech companies from complying with unlock orders for en-
crypted smartphones.” Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 589. Hurwitz argues compellingly that it
was no such thing. See Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 376–85; see also Morrison, supra note 1,
at 2075.
96 In re Apple, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 357.
422 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:407
The AWA remains a vehicle that several courts have used to compel innocent
third parties to assist law enforcement.97 But even if a consensus develops that the
AWA may be used to compel assistance, courts would still have to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether a requested order was agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.
Attempting to balance the interests in law enforcement, privacy, and private busi-
ness goals in each individual situation as part of an ad hoc series of judicial decisions
would be costly and inefficient. Companies might end up with different results in dif-
ferent jurisdictions (as Apple nearly did), creating uncertainty. In fact, there seems to
be a consensus that Congress needs to step in and make a decision on encryption.98
It is to that possibility that we now turn.
II. SHOULD CALEA BE AMENDED?
Should Congress pass or amend law that specifically allows courts to issue or-
ders of assistance like that in the Apple case, or even that would mandate such
assistance directly? While a statute of general application would answer some of
the constitutional issues in the California Apple case, there is still plenty of resis-
tance to the idea of amending or supplementing the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Overall, the arguments against legislation
come down to the following three objections: it would be unnecessary, it would be
futile, and it would be unsafe. Unnecessary, because we are currently in a golden age
of surveillance, so the government has nothing to complain about. Futile, because
97 See, e.g., Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 2004) (ob-
serving that a court may issue an AWA injunction against anyone, including a non-party,
who is “in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper adminis-
tration of justice, . . . even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice”
(quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977))); United States v. City
of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the AWA permits district courts
“to bind nonparties in order to prevent the frustration of consent decrees that determine
parties’ obligations under the law”); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 266 F.3d 45,
50 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The [AWA]’s grant of authority is plainly broad and, on its face, makes
no distinctions between parties and nonparties.”); Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers,
858 F.2d 855, 863 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the AWA authorizes action against a non-
party to the original action in “exceptional circumstances” in which the non-parties “are in
a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of
justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder
justice” (internal quotations and emphasis omitted) (quoting Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d
46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986))).
98 See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 411–12; Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 599–600;
Morrison, supra note 1, at 2081–82; Traylor, supra note 26, at 512–15. It certainly would be
helpful if Congress clarified matters, although given how dysfunctional the chambers have
become, this solution might not be forthcoming anytime soon.
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if rules against unbreakable encryption are enforced in the United States, the bad guys
will just switch to evanescent technologies or servers in Kazakhstan. Unsafe, be-
cause any access will effectively mandate a backdoor that will jeopardize the pri-
vacy of millions for the sake of investigating a handful of malefactors. There are
doubtless additional arguments to be made,99 but I will focus on these three.
A. Necessity and Futility
The first question is whether all this is necessary. Privacy advocates argue that
there is no real need for government access to encrypted devices. One plausible ar-
gument against Congressional action is that, far from “going dark,” we are actually
in a “golden age of surveillance.”100 Some commentators point to all the various sources
of information now available—“granular location information,” vast networks of asso-
ciates, viewing and reading habits, in short, everything that constitutes the ever-growing
“‘digital dossiers’ about individuals’ lives”—and conclude that “[c]ompared with
earlier periods, surveillance capabilities have greatly expanded.”101
Matt Olsen, Bruce Schneier, and Jonathan Zittrain point to several other features
of technology that suggest that one type of surveillance may be replaced by an-
other.102 The “Internet of Things” would seem to offer multiple possibilities for sur-
veillance as the objects people interact with every day could be commandeered by
law enforcement.103 Encryption itself has natural limits, since the business model of
most companies requires them to retain enough access to users’ information to bom-
bard them with tailored ads.104 The ability to map people’s contacts on social media
and build sophisticated networking models is a relatively new phenomenon.105 So
the loss of agency access because of encryption may be marginal, and “more than
offset by surveillance gains from computing and communications technology.”106
Still, while there is indeed more information available than ever before, this new
information does not precisely supplant the lost information.107 There is a wide
99 A few that come to mind are reliance, in that it would be unfair to amend CALEA after
companies—and their customers—have gotten used to unbreakable encryption; loss of mar-
ket share; and so forth.
100 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 34.
101 Id.
102 See MATT OLSEN ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U., DON’T
PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 9–10, 12 (2016), https://cyber
.harvard.edu/publications/2016/Cybersecurity/Dont_Panic [https://perma.cc/AX5T-NRT8].
103 See id. at 12–15.
104 See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler & Jack Marshall, Google Imitates Facebook with Email Mar-
keting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2015, at B4.
105 See Simeon Edosomwan et al., The History of Social Media and Its Impact on Busi-
ness, 16 J. APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 79 (2011).
106 See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 34.
107 See Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 400–01.
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variety of relevant information that can only be found on a physical smartphone.108
If the phone’s user is unavailable or uncooperative,109 law enforcement hits a dead end.
The Manhattan District Attorney’s Office noted that, in its office alone, there were
hundreds of cases adversely affected because of lawfully seized iPhones and iPads
that remained unsearchable.110
On the other hand, Apple’s defenders argue that any attempt to require assis-
tance would push toward creating a backdoor that Apple, many in the tech industry,
and even many in government, oppose.111 It could also be very costly to targets of
such orders, like Apple, both in terms of labor required to comply and their loss of
market share against foreign companies who may retain strong encryption and who
are not within the reach of such orders.112 Access could also tarnish Apple’s brand.113
108 This includes “iMessage content and details (e.g., dates, times, phone numbers involved),
SMS/MMS content, historical cell site data, historical GPS data, contacts, photos/videos,
internet search history, internet bookmarks, and third-party app data.” Jacobsen, supra note
20, at 578 (other internal citations omitted) (citing DA REPORT, supra note 62, at 6–8).
Jacobsen also reviews the reasons why access to the cloud accounts of suspects might not
provide the same information as that on the smartphone itself. See id. at 579–81.
109 Whether users are protected from being compelled to divulge their passcodes by the
Fifth Amendment is still up for dispute. For a discussion of this, see generally Caren Myers
Morrison, Passwords, Profiles, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Facebook and
the Fifth Amendment, 65 ARK. L. REV. 133, 134 (2012).
110 See DA REPORT, supra note 62, at 8 (noting that there were 423 phones and tablets in
its custody that could not be accessed).
111 Nick Wingfield & Mike Isaac, Apple Letter on iPhone Security Draws Muted Tech
Industry Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/tech
nology/tech-reactions-on-apple-highlight-issues-with-government-requests.html.
112 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation and 46 Technologists,
Researchers, and Cryptographers, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Ex-
ecution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. 16-
cm-00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016). The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) amicus
brief argued that the requested order would have required Apple to draft code and then elec-
tronically sign the code, signaling Apple’s trust in the code and “its endorsement and stamp
of approval.” Id. at 4. The EFF described this as compelled speech that would force Apple
“to express itself in conflict with its stated beliefs.” Id. at 7. A number of amici for Apple ex-
pressed concern that the requested order would undermine Apple’s business model, and
Apple raised arguments that forcing its engineers to write code at the government’s behest
would be conscription “on a mission that is contrary to the values of the company and these
individuals.” Apple Inc.’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Va-
cate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 25, In re Search of an Apple
iPhone, No. CM 16-10 (SP) (Mar. 15, 2016). For a discussion of the Lochnerian arguments
and Thirteenth Amendment ramifications, see Morrison, supra note 1, at 2078–79.
113 Whether most consumers would care is another matter. See Lee Rainie, The State of
Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/H9ZS-R3WM]
(noting that “Americans express a consistent lack of confidence about the security of every-
day communication channels and the organizations that control them”).
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Finally, without a new statute or amendment, would the government really be
any worse off? In the earliest days of organizational investigations, communications
most often took place face-to-face, and there was no lasting evidence of who had met
with whom, or what was said.114 The best information in those days was obtained
by engaging the cooperation of co-conspirators. The use today by some malefactors
of the types of evanescent messaging that leave no trace is not so different—in the
absence of an informant, the information is beyond reach. But psychologically, it is
hard to accept the loss of something that was yours, however briefly.115
In the meantime, arguments abound about the ways malefactors can easily mi-
grate to non-American-made encryption technology, or use messaging apps that re-
tain no more information than a face-to-face conversation, making any legislation
essentially pointless.
B. Security
Probably the most compelling argument that access should not be legislated is
that it would be unsafe. The “Keys Under Doormats” group argues vigorously that
mandating a backdoor would lead to widespread harm.116 In its view, weakening
encryption is tantamount to banning it altogether.117 On the other hand, at least one
proposal has been made that appears to have potential.118 Matt Tait, an information
security specialist, proposes a modification to Apple’s Cloud Key Vault, currently
114 The notorious mafia “walk-talks,” whereby mobsters took walks with confederates to
escape bugging by law enforcement, are a prominent example of this. See GENE MUSTAIN
& JERRY CAPECI, MOB STAR: THE STORY OF JOHN GOTTI 300–01 (1988).
115 Cognitive psychologists refer to this as the “endowment effect,” which is the phenom-
enon of valuing what you have over something comparable that you do not, and “loss aversion,”
which is the impulse not to lose what you already have, even if it is replaced by something
of similar value. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
116 See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., COMPUT. SCI. & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB., KEYS
UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 1–3, 10 (2015), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97690
[https://perma.cc/CYQ2-A8RS].
117 See, e.g., id. at 2–3; ABELSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 6–7; Michael A. Specter,
Apple’s Cloud Key Vault, Exceptional Access, and False Equivalences, LAWFARE (Sept. 7,
2016, 11:06 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/apples-cloud-key-vault-exceptional-access
-and-false-equivalences [https://perma.cc/3ANB-5A9J].
118 The Manhattan DA likes the proposal: “One technologist has proposed a method that
would provide secure, lawful access to phones’ contents by placing the filesystem key that can
decrypt data on the phone in a series of cryptographic envelopes that, like Russian dolls, are
‘nested,’ one envelope inside the other.” See DA REPORT, supra note 62, at 15 (citing Matt Tait,
An Approach to Jim Comey’s Technical Challenge, LAWFARE (Apr. 27, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/approach-James-Comeys-technical-challenge [https://perma
.cc/3AEM-22T7]).
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their newest form of crypto-security.119 In August 2016, Apple announced that it had
developed the Cloud Key Vault, which Tait describes as “the very thing that they
and the privacy community have been saying for years is reckless, dangerous or im-
possible: a high-value encryption key secured in a vault such that the key can’t be
stolen or misused by hackers or malicious insiders.”120
Prior to the Cloud Key Vault, one of the ways that Apple kept users’ data secure
was through its “Secure Enclave” processor, which would permanently lock a device
after ten unsuccessful password entry attempts—indeed, this was what prevented the
FBI from mounting a “brute force” attack on the San Bernardino iPhone.121 Apple
then developed the iCloud keychain, which enabled users to automatically synchro-
nize their saved passwords across other Apple devices, but encrypts those passwords
before uploading them.122 And in order to protect those encrypted passwords now
uploaded to the Cloud, it developed the Cloud Key Vault, which Tait describes as
a kind of “enormous Secure Enclave for the entire iCloud data-center,” managing the
number of PIN guesses and “ensur[ing] that after ten failed PIN guesses, the data in
the encrypted keychain file becomes permanently inaccessible.”123
But the company still faced two vulnerabilities in the face of hackers and law
enforcement subpoenas: the fact “that the attacker could get ahold of the master en-
cryption key hidden inside the Cloud Key Vault,” and its own ability to upload new
code to the Vault itself that could disable or reset the password attempt counter so
that government agencies could discover PINs by brute force.124 Apple’s solution
was to destroy its access to the Vault in such a way that once the access is destroyed
“Cloud Key Vault operates entirely autonomously according to the code written at
the time when it started.”125
And because that code cannot be tampered with or changed without destroying
the contents, Apple had basically found a solution to the often-used argument that
119 See Matt Tait, Apple’s Cloud Key Vault and Secure Law Enforcement Access, LAWFARE
(Sept. 14, 2016, 10:09 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/apples-cloud-key-vault-and-se
cure-law-enforcement-access [https://perma.cc/RF9R-ZQA4]. I hasten to add that the tech-
nical ramifications of these arguments are above my pay grade, so I am going to assume that
Tait knows what he is talking about.
120 Matt Tait, Apple at BlackHat: Reopening the “Going Dark” Debate, LAWFARE (Aug. 12,
2016, 9:42 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/apple-blackhat-reopening-going-dark-debate [https:
//perma.cc/C46V-GM4U].
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. As Tait explains, “Apple employees have no administrative access to the device.
They cannot reach in and take out the master encryption key. They cannot reach in and reset
the ‘failed PIN-guess’ counter on any file. They cannot even upload new code to the device,”
because doing so would trigger “the destruction of the master-key, thereby causing the cryp-
tographic self-destruction of all of the uploaded keychain files.” Id.
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“the technology community simply does not know how to securely store high-value
encryption keys such that they can be used, but can’t be stolen or misused by hack-
ers or malicious insiders.”126 Or, for that matter, by the government.
According to Tait, this creates a conundrum for Apple. Ordinarily, he explains,
tech companies’ reasons for not being able to assist law enforcement in executing
search warrants or responding to subpoenas “boil down to ‘sorry, we don’t have the
content’ or ‘sorry, we don’t have the keys.’ But this variant is something else: ‘sorry,
the data is in the computer over there, and we’ve intentionally locked ourselves
out of the computer.’”127 This adds a certain ambiguity to CALEA’s requirement
that a communications company only be required to assist if it “possesses the in-
formation necessary to decrypt the communication.”128 If the company in question129
possessed the information, but has deliberately destroyed it when it destroyed the
access cards, it seems more difficult to invoke the statute’s protection.
At the same time, the Cloud Key Vault setup suggests a way to keep a secure
form of access to user’s data: what Tait dubs an “Access Key Vault.”130 As Tait ex-
plains, “Apple devices store user backup files inside an envelope only [Apple’s Cloud
Key Vault] can decrypt and uploads this sealed envelope to Apple’s servers.”131 He
proposes an Access Key Vault (AKV) system, which
by contrast, could store the device’s decryption key inside an en-
velope only the AKV can decrypt, and store this AKV-sealed
envelope on the device itself. This way, to get the AKV enve-
lope, someone would need to first seize a device, and then foren-
sically recover the AKV envelope from it. Only the AKV would
be able to decrypt the sealed envelope with its secret private key,
and thus nobody would be able to get at the individual device’s
decryption key inside without first delivering the envelope to
AKV technicians who would then feed the envelope into the
AKV vault for decryption.132
Under this scheme, only one in possession of the device could even begin the
decryption process. The additional safeguards of automatic, undeletable logging of
decryption attempts, the fact that the AKV secret private key would never leave
Apple’s headquarters, and “splitting keys over multiple AKVs distributed over
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Morrison, supra note 1, at 2062 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2012)).
129 Again, this provision of CALEA only applies to telecommunications carriers, but for
the sake of argument, let’s assume it did cover Apple.
130 Tait, supra note 119.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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multiple organizations” would further raise the cost and complications of hacking.133
Compromising such a system, argues Tait, “would require a grand conspiracy of
technicians going rogue at multiple different organizations or that multiple air-
gapped computer networks be hacked to compromise the technicians directly,”134
and would be “limited to the unauthorized decryption of a small number of indi-
vidually targeted devices to which the plotters must already have forensic local phys-
ical access.”135
“Perhaps this scheme does not meet the platonic ideal of ‘secure,’” concludes Tait,
“but describing the risk as ‘high potential for catastrophic loss’ seems to me an abuse
of ordinary language.”136 It does seem plausible that a system of nested keys to un-
lock phones that are in the possession of the government does not pose the kinds of
security risks on a massive scale like the ones the public has already suffered.137
C. How Congress Might Move Forward
There has been a flurry of bills proposed so far, most of which either ban or
fully endorse encryption. For example, the Secure Data Act of 2015 would “pro-
hibit Federal agencies from mandating the deployment of vulnerabilities in data
security technologies.”138 This bill would prohibit the government from “man-
dat[ing] that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of covered products design or alter
the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user
of such product or service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any
agency.”139 “Covered product[s]” include “any computer hardware, computer soft-
ware, or electronic device that is made available to the general public.”140 This po-
sition is echoed in the language of the proposed ENCRYPT Act of 2016, which
would prevent the government from interfering with any commercial encryption,141
133 Id.
134 Id. But see Hurwitz, supra note 5, at 414. He argues that the issue is not so much male-
factors getting ahold of one of the escrowed keys, but “that it is simply very, very difficult
to design a secure multi-party cryptosystem, and it is even more difficult to correctly im-
plement that design.” Id. Again, I will leave the technological feasibility of a split-key es-
crow system to the experts.
135 Tait, supra note 119.
136 Id.
137 See Traylor, supra note 26, at 496–97 (listing some of the widespread data breaches
of the past few years). And that was before over 140 million consumers had their personal
information compromised in the Equifax breach. See Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html.
138 S. 135, 114th Cong. pmbl. (2015).
139 Id. § 2(a).
140 Id. § 2(c)(2).
141 Ensuring National Constitutional Rights for Your Private Telecommunications Act of
2016, H.R. 4528, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2016) (providing that no state or subdivision
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and opposed by the Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016, which would force
companies to “provide such technical assistance as is necessary” to produce data “in
an intelligible format.”142
In June 2016, the House Committee on Homeland Security issued a report on
the encryption debate, concluding that what was needed was a National Commis-
sion on Security and Technology Challenges constituted of “experts in the fields of
commercial technology, computer science and cryptology, privacy and civil lib-
erties, law enforcement, intelligence, and global economics.”143 This would allow
a more nuanced balancing of interests. As the House Committee noted, the debate
is not really about “privacy versus security” so much as it is between one type of
security and another—the security of our data and infrastructure versus our physical
public safety.144
It could be that the facts are as the privacy advocates say, and that the game of
regulating technological assistance is not worth the candle. Ultimately, the issues of
necessity, futility and security raise empirical questions that are best resolved by
experts, and a commission or series of public hearings could do that job.
of a state may prohibit the use of encryption or compel any entity to “design or alter the secu-
rity functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product
or service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any agency or instrumentality
of a State . . . or the United States”).
142 S.__, 114th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(B) (Discussion Draft 2016), https://www.eff.org/document
/burr-feinstein-encryption-bill-discussion-draft [https://perma.cc/D9DS-89PS].
143 STAFF OF H. HOMELAND SEC. COMM., 114TH CONG., GOING DARK, GOING FORWARD:
A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE 4 (2016), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/07/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6YJ
-HY4J]. A similar idea was suggested by former FBI Director James Comey, who called for
“an adult conversation” on encryption. See Eric Tucker, Comey: FBI Wants ‘Adult Conver-
sation’ on Device Encryption, AP (Aug. 31, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7d57f576
3f74b6ca4cd3436fbebf160/comey-fbi-wants-adult-conversation-device-encryption [https://
perma.cc/DCW6-5N2S]. This prompted some mockery from the tech sector. See, e.g., Mike
Masnick, James Comey Claims He Wants an ‘Adult Conversation’ About Encryption; Ap-
parently ‘Adults’ Ignore Experts, TECHDIRT (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:38 AM), https://www.techdirt
.com/articles/20160831/00094935397/james-comey-claims-he-wants-adult-conversation
-about-encryption-apparently-adults-ignore-experts.html [https://perma.cc/K5F2-G3L9] (de-
scribing Comey’s call as “not just insulting, but counterproductive”).
144 See STAFF OF H. HOMELAND SEC. COMM., supra note 143, at 6. This is not to say that
cellphone searches are limited to terrorism investigations, as they are also implicated in many
other crimes, including kidnapping and human trafficking. See Vance, Jr. et al., supra note
16. There have also been a handful of murders where clues to the perpetrators’ identity might
have been found in locked smartphones. See Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 570–71 (citing the
murders of Brittney Mills in April 2015 and Ray C. Owens in June 2015, and the possible
murder of George Mitego in July 2015); see also Vance, Jr. et al., supra note 16. And the losses
aren’t just for prosecutors, as smartphone evidence has been used in exonerating innocent
people as well. See Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 577–78.
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III. WHAT SHOULD A DUTY TO ASSIST MEAN?
Let’s say that the evidence points to the fact that the government is not entirely
going dark, or that the evidence is inconclusive. We face the following situation:
Apple, and companies like it, cannot comply with requests to help execute warrants
because they have created a system where compliance is impossible. If there is a
duty to assist, whether it is conceived of as a negative duty or a positive obligation,
does that technological choice violate any such duty?
A. The Duty to Assist
“It is the duty and the right . . . of every citizen,” observed the Supreme Court
in 1895, “to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, any breach of
the peace of the United States.”145 The duty to assist the government in enforcing the
law has deep common-law roots, as one state court explained: “The basic concept
that every citizen can be compelled to assist in the pursuit or apprehension of sus-
pected criminals has ancient Saxon origins, predating the Norman Conquest.”146
Chief Judge Cardozo traced the obligation to help law enforcement “back to the
[early] days of the hue and cry” in the thirteenth century.147 This was a practice which
obligated “[a]ll true men” to participate in the work of apprehending those charged
with breaking the law.148 Indeed, those who failed to do so, or did not keep ade-
quate weaponry for the purpose,149 were themselves liable to be prosecuted.150 These
145 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895). The Court added: “It is the right, as well as the
duty, of every citizen, when called upon by the proper officer, to act as part of the posse
comitatus in upholding the laws of his country.” Id. The posse comitatus “has been defined as
the power or force of the county, consisting of the entire population of the county over the
age of 15, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, such as keeping the
peace, pursuing and arresting felons, etc.” Williams v. State, 490 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ark. 1973)
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (4th ed. 1968)). “Refusal to render the aid sought
by the sheriff was an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment.” Id. (citations omitted).
146 State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157, 1166 (Conn. 1991).
147 Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928).
148 See id. (“‘The main rule we think to be this,’ say the historians of our early law (Pollock
& Maitland, History of English Law, vol. 2, p. 580) ‘that felons ought to be summarily ar-
rested and put in gaol. All true men ought to take part in this work and are punishable if they
neglect it.’ Cf. Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 294; vol. 3, p. 599; vol. 4, p. 521;
Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 85.”). The Babington court further explained, “The law did not
limit itself to imposing upon the manhood of the country a duty to pursue. To make pursuit
effective, there were statutes in those early days whereby a man was subject to a duty to
provide himself with instruments sufficient for the task.” Id.
149 Chief Judge Cardozo cited, as an example, the Statute of Winchester from 1285, which
required that every man with sufficient property keep “an Hauberk [a Breastplate] of Iron,
a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse.” Id. (alteration in original).
150 See id. (“We may be sure that the man who failed to use his horse, and who would
only go afoot, would have had to answer to the king.” (citations omitted)); see also Williams,
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obligations persisted up to colonial times. The Colony of Massachusetts statuto-
rily required citizens to “diligently pursue[ ]” the “Hue [and] cries,”151 and provided
that, if “any shal wilfully, obstinately or contemptuously refuse or neglect to assist
any Constable . . . he shall pay to the use of the Country fourty shillings.”152 In the
modern(ish)-day equivalent that Cardozo was considering, a police officer had
jumped on the running board of a taxi, and ordered the driver to chase another car.153
During the ensuing chase, the taxi driver was killed and the taxi company opposed
paying Workmen’s Compensation on the basis he was not in the performance of his
duties at the time of the crash.154 In rebuffing the taxi company, Cardozo was un-
equivocal: “[T]he citizenry may be called upon to enforce the justice of the state, not
faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever im-
plements and facilities are convenient and at hand.”155
Moreover, he was clear that the duty also extended to corporate citizens: “The
incorporeal being, the Yellow Taxi Corporation, would have been bound to respond
in that spirit to the summons of the officer if it had been sitting in the driver’s seat.”156
Justice White, in his opinion in New York Telephone, recognized that simi-
larly, “citizens have a duty to assist in enforcement of the laws.”157 There remain
numerous state laws on the books criminalizing a failure or refusal to help law en-
forcement.158 If the basis of these laws is still valid, then the demands on telephone
490 S.W.2d at 120 (“The criminal nature of refusal to aid an officer in the execution of his
duties was recognized in Regina v. Brown, 41 Eng. Common Law Reports 175 (1841).”);
Blue, supra note 15, at 1480–81 (noting that “if a malefactor was not caught by the hue and
cry, a financial penalty would be levied on the entire township” (citing 2 HENRY DE BRACTON,
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 350 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968))). As the
Williams court described it, in Brown, a constable came upon an illegal prize fight and sought
to arrest the participants, enlisting the help of Brown. Williams, 490 S.W.2d at 120. The
English court held that “one duly called upon to render such assistance was not excused ex-
cept for physical impossibility or lawful excuse.” Id. This rule then migrated the United
States, where “the practice has been utilized in law enforcement throughout the history of
this country.” Id. at 120–21.
151 Blue, supra note 15, at 1481 (citation omitted).
152 THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS
OF THE MASSACHUSETS 13 (Cambridge, 1648).
153 See Babington, 164 N.E. at 726.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 727.
156 Id.
157 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 176 n.24 (1977).
158 Blue notes that “[m]ost states statutorily authorize police officers to command by-
standers to assist them in their law enforcement duties,” and that many of those states “make
a failure to obey such a command a criminal offense.” Blue, supra note 15, at 1475–76; see,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-5 (2017) (criminalizing refusal to aid police officer); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 150 (West 2017) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-107 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-167b (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1241 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 843.06 (2017); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.15 (West 2017);
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or information service companies could be thought of as a duty of citizenship. In
that light, the government could prevent private citizens and companies from ac-
tively frustrating law enforcement investigations.
B. What Do We Do About Warrants?
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States159 famously observed that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”160 But what about a warrant
without a search? If the “going dark” debate presents an empirical question, how
much we should respect warrants raises a question of social ordering. It is not self-
evident that private actors—in particular, commercial entities that profit by market-
ing themselves as champions of privacy—should be able to determine unilaterally
that a certain class of information should be beyond the reach of law enforcement. Even
if we accept the “Golden Age of Surveillance” premise, there is arguably something
of value lost if certain types of warrants become meaningless.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is based in large part on deterring unlawful
police conduct, and requiring a warrant is supposed to enhance police compliance
with the law. There may be nothing magical about a search warrant,161 but it is a
manifestation of a social compact: government agents have the right to conduct
reasonable searches and seizures, but the deal is that they cannot do so unless they
get a warrant. (This statement is highly qualified, since almost no searches actually
require warrants, but bear with me.) If they get a warrant based on probable cause,162
they can search, as long as the search is reasonable. But if the warrants they obtain
are pointless, this could conceivably undermine police respect for the process.163
And it is rarely a good idea to encourage law enforcement to engage in self-help.
This is not to say that a search warrant or other court order, even one validly is-
sued and based upon probable cause, provides absolute authorization to search. If there
are circumstances that make the search unreasonable, even if it has been sanctioned
by a judicial officer, the police cannot search.164 For example, in Winston v. Lee,165
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 301 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-463 (2017). Blue notes, however,
“that these laws are not widely used.” Blue, supra note 15, at 1476.
159 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
160 Id. at 357 (citation omitted).
161 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
883 (1991) (noting “the lack of any working theory of what warrants are supposed to ac-
complish”); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 1609 (2012).
162 Some types of searches, like wiretaps, statutorily require a showing of necessity as well,
making Title III orders something like “super” warrants. See Kerr, supra note 47, at 1232.
163 See Stuntz, supra note 161, at 909.
164 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
165 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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the Supreme Court did not allow the police to “search” for a bullet in the chest of
a robbery suspect.166 Despite the fact that the police had probable cause and a court
order, the Court found the search would be unreasonable because the extent of the
intrusion, surgery under general anesthetic, was not outweighed by a “compelling
need” on the part of the government.167
Once the government obtains a valid warrant based upon probable cause, wrote
Justice Brennan, “it is ordinarily justifiable for the community to demand that the
individual give up some part of his interest in privacy and security to advance the
community’s vital interests in law enforcement; such a search is generally ‘reason-
able’ in the Amendment’s terms.”168 But “compelled surgical intrusion into an in-
dividual’s body for evidence,” was not an ordinary search because it “implicate[d]
expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be
‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”169 The Court therefore
weighed the magnitude of the intrusion (surgery with a non-negligible risk of com-
plications) against the community’s need for the evidence.170 Because the gov-
ernment had other sources of evidence, including eyewitness identification by the
victim, the search was unreasonable.171
C. Reconstructing an Inviolable Zone of Privacy
One way of thinking about Apple’s position is that making them assist in the
execution of searches (which would entail breaking their own encryption, building
backdoors, or what have you), is simply not reasonable.172 In other words, the in-
terference with the company’s business or beliefs could be as damaging as the
intrusion on the bodily integrity and dignitary concerns of a suspect.173
166 Id. at 766. This was similar to the conclusion of the Indiana Supreme Court a decade ear-
lier. See Adams v. State, 299 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Ind. 1973) (holding that, even with a valid search
warrant, subjecting a robbery suspect to an operation to remove a bullet was unreasonable).
167 Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
168 Id. at 759.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 763.
171 See id. at 765.
172 Cf. State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157, 1159 (Conn. 1991) (holding that a statute crimi-
nalizing a failure to assist a police officer in effecting an arrest could only be applied if such
assistance was both demonstrably necessary and “reasonable under all the circumstances”).
173 And Apple is not even the target of the search, but a third party innocent of wrong-
doing. That said, Fourth Amendment law has not been overly solicitous of third parties in the
past, as demonstrated by United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). In a ruse right out
of a spy movie, an IRS informant lured an unsuspecting bank manager out to dinner, making
sure his briefcase remained at her apartment. Payner, 447 U.S. at 730. While a lookout team
kept watch at the restaurant, another informant let himself into the apartment with a key sup-
plied previously, stole the briefcase, and delivered it to IRS agents, who copied 400 pages
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Ultimately, not to regulate encryption represents a decision to put a certain class
of information—the kind that can be found on an individual’s phone—beyond law
enforcement reach. We could make the determination that this is the correct ap-
proach. But if companies are going to have the power unilaterally to exempt an en-
tire class of information from searches, there should be adequate justification. One
basis would be the unusually intimate and comprehensive trove of information to
be found on people’s phones. As Donald Dripps noted, there are “legitimate textual
and historical grounds for treating ‘papers’ and their modern counterparts with more
respect than other ‘effects.’”174
One hundred and thirty years ago, in Boyd v. United States,175 the Court inti-
mated that there should be areas completely free from government surveillance. In
Boyd, the Court invalidated an 1874 Customs Act that provided individuals subject
to civil forfeiture with a choice: produce requested documents or have the allega-
tions against them taken as confessed.176 Upholding the Act, reasoned Justice Bradley,
would sanction a “forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or
of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
goods.”177 This violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he wrote, because
there was no substantial difference between “the seizure of a man’s private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him” and “compelling him to be a witness
against himself.”178 Effectively, the “intimate relation” between the two amendments
meant that “search and seizure of books and papers may be ‘unreasonable’ even if
conducted pursuant to a court order.”179
Boyd’s vision of privacy was reaffirmed in Gouled v. United States,180 which con-
sidered an ordinary search conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. A warrant,
of documents, replacing it before the pair returned from dinner. Id. While the Court was
aghast at the IRS’s tactics, it had nothing to say about the inconvenience and indignity suf-
fered by the bank manager. See id. at 734.
174 Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private
“Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 53
(2013). Dripps notes that statutory authority did not even exist for seizing private papers until
1863, when Congress passed “An Act to [P]revent and [P]unish Frauds upon the Revenue.”
Id. at 87.
175 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
176 See id. at 620 (“[I]f [an individual, upon receiving a motion to produce] shall fail or re-
fuse to produce such book, invoice, or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated
in the said motion shall be taken as confessed . . . .” (quoting Section 5 Act of June 22, 1874)).
177 Id. at 630. Although Boyd was a civil case, the Court considered the proceedings to be
“in their nature criminal.” Id. at 634.
178 Id. at 633. “In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.”
Id. at 630. See generally Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–1976),
76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977) [hereinafter Life and Times].
179 Life and Times, supra note 178, at 184.
180 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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wrote the Court, “may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man’s house or
office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be
used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding.”181 In other words, the government
had to have some property interest in the items to be seized (or demonstrate that pos-
session of the items by the suspect was unlawful), or it could not seize them at all.182
Papers of “mere evidential value” were beyond the scope of a lawful warrant—the
so-called “mere evidence rule.”183
But the decisions following Boyd and Gouled began to “reduce[] the obstacles to
governmental seizure of an individual’s property,” and “narrow[] his effective zone of
privacy.”184 The mere evidence rule was officially laid to rest in Warden v. Hayden,185
and by the time the Court issued its decision in Katz v. United States,186 the Court
no longer seemed to believe that any area, of itself, was immune to search, so long
as a warrant was obtained and the search was conducted in a reasonable manner.187
Still, there is an aura that surrounds private papers, and by extension, most of the
information on computers and mobile devices, that could support different treatment.
Maybe history supports Apple. But if so, that is a decision to be made in a pub-
lic forum, by the courts or the legislature, in a reasoned fashion.
181 Id. at 309.
182 See id. The Court did note that “[t]here is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished
from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure,” so long as
they were adequately described in the warrant and belonged to a class of documents that could
be seized, such as “[s]tolen or forged papers” or “lottery tickets.” Id.
183 See id. at 310; see also Life and Times, supra note 178, at 191.
184 Life and Times, supra note 178, at 193. This idea found its most eloquent expression
in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Olmstead
Court had upheld the right of the FBI to tap Olmstead’s phone without a warrant, because
doing so did not invade his property rights. See id. at 466 (relying on the fact that “the [tele-
phone] wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment”). Justice Brandeis’s dissent famously argued that the
Fourth Amendment’s point was not to enforce property law but to protect a “right to be let
alone”—in other words, not that all searches needed a warrant, but that some searches should
not happen at all:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favor-
able to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
185 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
186 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
187 As now-professor Krauss put it in his student note, “[n]o zone of privacy now exists
that the government cannot enter.” Life and Times, supra note 178, at 211. See generally Stanton
David Krauss, http://webspace.quinnipiac.edu/Krauss/RESUME%20for%20web%20page
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS25-SG5B] (providing Prof. Krauss’s résumé, in which he is listed
as the author of the unsigned student note, Life and Times, supra note 178).
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CONCLUSION
We end up where we began, with our original question: What assistance do pri-
vate actors owe law enforcement? Apart from antiquated laws that require assistance
when the police are pursuing a suspect, the law rarely requires companies to take
positive action. Asking companies to conform their design and innovation strategies
to government blueprints does seem to interfere with their autonomy. The wrinkle
here is that Apple has specifically designed a system that it cannot itself access—it
built a key, locked itself out, then destroyed the key.
In an ideal world, there would be a Congressional solution, based on a factual
balancing of the different interests. As the situation stands, the tech sector and the
government can only look forward to more litigation, more conflict, and more un-
certainty. To have some clarity in this area would be good. Having a coherent prin-
ciple to justify the solution would be even better.
